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GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS REDUCTIONS 
NICHOLAS DIMASCIO 
INTRODUCTION 
An ever-increasing proportion of U.S. business leaders and a 
number of influential think tanks expect that a nationwide climate 
change regulatory program will be enacted in the United States 
within the next ten years. Several factors are increasing the pressure 
to shift United States climate policy from voluntary programs to 
mandatory, nationwide regulation of carbon dioxide and other 
greenhouse gases. First, scientists have reached a near-worldwide 
consensus that climate change is real and human induced.1 Second, 
there has been an upsurge in global warming-related litigation against 
governmental and corporate actors.2 Third, the link between good 
corporate governance and assessment of climate change risk has 
gained credibility as insurance companies and investors have begun to 
demand this information.3 
 
Copyright © 2007 by Nicholas DiMascio. 
 1. The national science academies of the Group of Eight (G8) nations, which includes the 
United States, signed a joint statement on climate change that states that the science is now 
sufficiently clear to justify taking prompt regulatory action at the national level. Global 
Response to Climate Change, STATEMENT (Joint Sci. Acad.), June 7, 2005, at 1–2, available at 
http://nationalacademies.org/onpi/06072005.pdf. 
 2. See Lori R. Baker, Global Warming: Attorneys General Declare Public Nuisance, 27 U. 
HAW. L. REV. 525, 525–26 (2005) (describing the development of public nuisance suits brought 
by private “attorneys general” against utility companies with the goal of reducing carbon 
dioxide emissions); Matthew F. Pawa & Benjamin A. Krass, Global Warming as a Public 
Nuisance: Connecticut v. American Electric Power, 16 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 407, 408–09 
(2005) (describing a trend of public nuisance suits brought against power corporations with the 
goal of requiring a reduction in emissions). 
 3. See Elizabeth E. Hancock, Note, Red Dawn, Blue Thunder, Purple Rain: Corporate 
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Most importantly, corporations are facing new regulatory risks 
related to climate change. U.S. multinational corporations often have 
operations in nations that have enacted mandatory emissions 
regulations in accordance with the Kyoto Protocol’s4 first compliance 
period, which begins in 2008. Individual U.S. states have also begun 
enacting their own mandatory greenhouse gas reduction regulations 
to fill the void left by federal inaction. Such states include the seven 
northeastern states participating in the Regional Greenhouse Gas 
Initiative5 (RGGI) and California.6 
These trends have begun to reverse the tide against nationwide 
greenhouse gas regulation in the United States. The leaders of many 
corporations consider greenhouse gas regulation inevitable and fear 
having to comply with a diverse array of regulatory requirements 
from individual states.7 Major businesses leaders have publicly called 
for a national regulatory program and Congress has begun to 
respond.8 Nearly one hundred climate change-related proposals were 
introduced in the 108th Congress,9 over one hundred were introduced 
 
Risk of Liability for Global Climate Change and the SEC Disclosure Dilemma, 17 GEO. INT’L 
ENVTL. L. REV. 233, 239 (2005) (noting that an increase in scientific knowledge regarding 
climate change has correlated with an increase in investors’ attention to corporate activities); J. 
Kevin Healy & Jeffrey M. Tapick, Climate Change: It’s Not Just a Policy Issue for Corporate 
Counsel—It’s a Legal Problem, 29 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 89, 102 (2004) (noting that the world’s 
second largest reinsurance company now inquires into whether corporations seeking directors 
and officers liability insurance have developed a plan to address the liability risk of climate 
change); Perry E. Wallace, Global Climate Change and the Challenge to Modern American 
Corporate Governance, 55 SMU L. REV. 493, 513 (2002) (noting that an alliance of “consumer 
groups, socially responsible investors, labor unions, environmentalists, and human rights 
activists . . . have begun to agitate against recent changes in the global economy” and have 
“shifted their attention to multinational firms and international organizations”). 
 4. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 
Dec. 11, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 22. 
 5. Reg’l Greenhouse Gas Initiative, About RGGI, http://www.rggi.org/states.htm (last 
visited Mar. 9, 2007). 
 6. California Climate Change Portal, http://www.climatechange.ca.gov/about.html (last 
visited Mar. 9, 2007). 
 7. Climate Change: EPA Program Preps Companies for Emissions Trading at Home and 
Abroad, GREENWIRE, Jan. 26, 2005, http://www.eenews.net/Greenwire/2005/01/26/#1 (last 
visited Apr. 16, 2007). 
 8. Climate: PG&E CEO Calls for U.S. to Cap Greenhouse Gas Emissions, GREENWIRE, 
Oct. 6, 2006, http://www.eenews.net/Greenwire/2006/10/06/archive/#10 (last visited Apr. 16, 
2007). 
 9. The Pew Center on Global Climate Change, 108th Congress Proposals, 
http://www.pewclimate.org/what_s_being_done/in_the_congress/108th.cfm (last visited Jan. 7, 
2007). 
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in the 109th Congress,10 and several bills that would establish 
mandatory reductions of greenhouse gas emissions appear poised for 
introduction in the next session.11 With the dramatic changes in 
membership in both the Senate and the House of Representatives of 
the 110th Congress, some in Washington speculate that federal action 
on climate change could come sooner rather than later.12 
In the meantime, corporations and other organizations have 
been participating in voluntary greenhouse gas emission reduction 
programs to prepare for eventual federal regulations.13 These early 
actors realize that emissions reductions are costly but understand that 
failing to prepare for mandatory emissions limits will increase their 
costs of compliance even further. If early movers’ current efforts do 
not comport with yet to be enacted standards, however, early action 
could in fact increase their costs of compliance. The state and 
voluntary programs that exist employ a diverse array of standards and 
requirements, and each of the bills floating in Congress would 
establish an emissions reduction program with different parameters. 
Faced with the risk of achieving reductions that will not be credited 
later, greenhouse gas emitters would no doubt prefer to adopt a wait-
and-see strategy for coping with climate change regulation. But if 
mandatory emissions limits truly are inevitable, postponing action 
due to regulatory uncertainty is both economically inefficient and 
environmentally harmful. 
If the United States enacts a cap-and-trade system for 
greenhouse gas emissions, the program will likely acknowledge and 
reward some emissions reductions achieved before the program 
formally goes into effect.14 A future federal program may limit credit 
for early reductions to those entities that have monitored, verified, 
and registered the reductions in accordance with a voluntary registry 
 
 10. The Pew Center on Global Climate Change, 109th Congress Proposals, 
http://www.pewclimate.org/what_s_being_done/in_the_congress/109th.cfm (last visited Jan. 7, 
2007). 
 11. See infra note 108 and accompanying text. 
 12. Charles Babington, Party Shift May Make Warming a Hill Priority, WASH. POST, Nov. 
18, 2006, at A06; see also Janet Hook & Richard Simon, Climate Is Changing, Politically: New 
Attention from Presidential Hopefuls and Others that Global Warming Is Not Just the 
Democrats’ Issue Anymore, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 31, 2007, at A1 (describing recent bipartisan 
congressional interest in climate change). 
 13. See infra Part I. 
 14. Three of the four proposed regulations reviewed in Part III contain explicit provisions 
for crediting early action, and the fourth leaves the possibility open to the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) administrator’s discretion. 
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or mandatory state regulatory program. A federal program could also 
place limits on the types of reduction activities that will be credited or 
the amount of early credits that can be used for compliance. Early 
emissions reducers should therefore tailor their current activities to 
be as closely aligned with the parameters of a future federal program 
as possible. 
This Note aims to inform greenhouse gas emitters and 
policymakers about the efficiency, equity, and environmental benefits 
of providing credit for early emissions reductions. Part I presents the 
emerging belief that federal regulation of greenhouse gas emissions is 
inevitable. Part II explores the arguments for and against providing 
early actors with future regulatory credit for their current emissions 
reductions. Part III explains the lack of a legal basis for providing 
prospective credit for early emissions reductions and the need to 
register current emissions reductions in a voluntary registry. Part IV 
identifies the design elements of a future mandatory cap on 
greenhouse gas emissions that will affect early emissions reducers’ 
ability to claim credit for past emissions reductions. It then reviews 
and evaluates the early crediting provisions within several 
congressionally proposed cap-and-trade systems. In conclusion, this 
Note advocates a particular legislative method for providing early 
action credit, suggests guidelines for how emitters should structure 
their early reduction efforts, and advises early actors to oppose 
legislation that fails to recognize those early reduction efforts. 
I.  THE INEVITABILITY OF FEDERAL REGULATION 
There is no federal regulation requiring the reduction of 
greenhouse gas emissions within the United States, but many industry 
analysts and think tanks believe that is likely to change soon. A joint 
report released by Citigroup Investment Research and the World 
Resources Institute in June of 2006 states that pressures on the U.S. 
government to regulate greenhouse gases are nearing a “tipping 
point.”15 Point Carbon, a market analyst and forecasting company for 
power, gas, and carbon markets believes that there is a “high 
likelihood” that the U.S. federal government will establish a 
 
 15. CITIGROUP INV. RESEARCH & WORLD RESOURCES INST., INVESTING IN SOLUTIONS 
TO CLIMATE CHANGE 6 (2006) (on file with the Duke Law Journal). 
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regulatory system before 2013.16 In October of 2006, the Pew Center 
on Global Climate Change released the results of a survey of twenty-
four leading American companies about the possibility of federal 
regulation of greenhouse gases.17 Twenty-two responded that federal 
regulation was “imminent,” and, of these, sixteen believed that it 
would come between 2010 and 2015.18 The reports cite state and 
regional regulatory initiatives, growing concern among the general 
public, pressure from corporations, institutional investors, and 
insurance companies, and even private lawsuits as the catalysts for 
change at the federal level.19 
These predictions are borne out by recent action in the United 
States Congress. Although the 109th Congress voted down a bill that 
would have created a federal cap-and-trade system for greenhouse 
gases,20 it approved a nonbinding “Sense of the Senate” resolution 
that Congress should enact “mandatory, market-based limits” on 
greenhouse gas emissions.21 In April of 2006, the Senate Committee 
on Energy and Natural Resources, led by Senators Pete V. Domenici 
and Jeff Bingaman, solicited the opinions of industry, nonprofit, and 
academic thinkers on a white paper entitled “Design Elements of a 
Mandatory Market-Based Greenhouse Gas Regulatory System.”22 No 
fewer than six separate proposals for climate change legislation were 
introduced in the 109th Congress,23 several of which could be 
 
 16. Point Carbon, Carbon Trading in the US: The Hibernating Giant, CARBON MARKET 
ANALYST Sept. 13, 2006, at 14, available at http://www.pointcarbon.com/getfile.php/ 
fileelement_86516/CMA_US_ETS_Sept06__hkh9gtpd_1f.pdf. 
 17. ANDREW J. HOFFMAN, GETTING AHEAD OF THE CURVE: CORPORATE STRATEGIES 
THAT ADDRESS CLIMATE CHANGE (2006), available at http://www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/ 
PEW%5FCorpStrategies%2Epdf. 
 18. Id. at 1–3. 
 19. Id. 
 20. This bill was the McCain-Lieberman Climate Stewardship and Innovation Act of 2005, 
discussed infra Part IV. S. 1151, 109th Cong. (2005). 
 21. 151 CONG. REC. S7033–37 (daily ed. June 22, 2005) (Sense of the Senate on Climate 
Change, amending H.R. 6, 109th Cong. (2005)). 
 22. Climate Change: Conf. Before the S. Comm. on Energy & Natural Res., S. REP. NO. 109-
420 (2006) (Conf. Rep.), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi? 
dbname=109_senate_hearings&docid=f:28095.wais; see also White Paper, Sen. Pete V. 
Domenici & Jeff Bingaman, Design Elements of a Mandatory Mkt.-Based Greenhouse Gas 
Regulatory Sys. (Feb. 2006) (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (discussing a potential national 
regulatory program for greenhouse gases). 
 23. See Global Warming Reduction Act of 2006, S. 4039, 109th Cong. (2006); Global 
Warming Pollution Reduction Act, S. 3698, 109th Cong. (2006); Clean Air Planning Act of 2006, 
S. 2724, 109th Cong. (2006); Keep America Competitive Global Warming Policy Act of 2006, 
H.R. 5049, 109th Cong. (2006); 151 CONG. REC. S7090–98, (daily ed. June 22, 2005) (proposing 
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reintroduced or serve as models for proposals during the 110th 
Congress. Senator Barbara Boxer, the incoming chairwoman of the 
Senate Environment and Public Works Committee in 2007 and a 
cosponsor of a previous climate change bill, has already created two 
new subcommittees with jurisdiction over climate change.24 
Emitters of greenhouse gases in the United States that anticipate 
the enactment of such legislation have already begun to account for 
their emissions, to achieve emissions reductions, and to participate in 
federal, state, and private voluntary initiatives. As of October of 2006, 
over one hundred companies had voluntarily agreed to inventory and 
reduce their carbon emissions through the Environmental Protection 
Agency’s Climate Leaders Program.25 The number of companies 
submitting emissions data to the Department of Energy (DOE) in 
2004 as part of its Voluntary Reporting of Greenhouse Gases 
Program (1605(b) Program) reached 226.26 Similarly, the Chicago 
Climate Exchange, a private carbon emissions trading market that 
also imposes mandatory emissions limitations upon participants, has 
over 150 members from both the public and private sectors.27 
Companies participating in such initiatives believe that their 
early efforts will help to reduce their future costs, serve as positive 
publicity, and provide them with a stronger voice in the design of 
federal climate change policy.28 Many also believe that innovation in 
response to climate change will become a source of considerable 
profit for certain forward-thinking companies.29 As state level 
regulatory programs come into effect, many more companies will be 
accounting for reductions in greenhouse gas emissions prior to the 
institution of a federal regulatory regime. Future federal legislation 
 
an amendment, the Climate and Economy Insurance Act of 2005, to H.R. 6, 109th Cong. 
(2005)); Climate Stewardship and Innovation Act of 2005, S. 1151, 109th Cong. (2005). 
 24. Senator Boxer Reorganizes Environment Panel, Naming Two Global Warming 
Subcommittees, 37 ENV’T REP. (BNA) 46 (2006). 
 25. Press Release, EPA, Companies Set Aggressive Greenhouse Gas Emissions Reduction 
Goals (Oct. 12, 2006), available at http://yosemite.epa.gov/opa/admpress.nsf/a8f952395381d39 
68525701c005e65b5/abaf76a31c93d2e685257205006305cb!OpenDocument. 
 26. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., DEPT. OF ENERGY, VOLUNTARY REPORTING OF 
GREENHOUSE GASES 2004 ix (2006), available at http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/FTPROOT/envir 
onment/0608(04).pdf. 
 27. Chicago Climate Exchange, Members of the Chicago Climate Exchange, 
http://www.chicagoclimatex.com/about/members.html (last visited Mar. 7, 2007). 
 28. CITIGROUP INV. RESEARCH & WORLD RESEARCH INST., supra note 15, at 6. 
 29. Id. 
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will therefore have to consider how to treat these early emissions 
reductions. 
II.  THE EQUITY, EFFICIENCY, AND ENVIRONMENTAL BENEFIT OF 
EARLY ACTION CREDIT 
Although it appears likely, credit for early emissions reductions 
under future climate change legislation is by no means certain. Even 
if such legislation provides credit, it may also place severe restrictions 
on the amount or use of early action credits. This Part seeks to inform 
greenhouse gas emitters and policymakers about the equitable, 
efficiency, and environmental benefits that would accrue from 
providing broad credit for early action. 
Calling actions “early” is somewhat of a misnomer—some 
amount of climate change is already certain to result from past 
emissions.30 It remains crucial, however, that greenhouse gas emitters 
not wait until a mandatory regime is put in place to reduce their 
emissions. Greenhouse gases remain in the atmosphere long after 
they are emitted,31 so present emissions reductions are highly 
important for realizing the goal of the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC): “to achieve . . . 
stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a 
level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with 
the climate system.”32 Scientists predict that a doubling of the 
concentration of carbon dioxide (CO2) in the atmosphere from 
preindustrial levels will have dramatic consequences for the earth’s 
climate.33 Failure to achieve modest reductions in the short term may 
require more severe measures over the long term to avoid doubling 
atmospheric concentrations of CO2.
34 
 
 30. UNEP & UNFCCC, CLIMATE CHANGE INFORMATION KIT 5 (2002), available at 
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/publications/infokit_2002_en.pdf. 
 31. CEDRIC PHILIBERT & JONATHAN PERSHING, INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AGENCY, 
BEYOND KYOTO 13 (2002). 
 32. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change art. 2, May 9, 1992, S. 
TREATY DOC. NO. 102-38, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107. 
 33. Ann P. Kinzig & Daniel M. Kammen, National Trajectories of Carbon Emissions: 
Analysis of Proposals to Foster the Transition to Low-Carbon Economies, 8 GLOBAL ENVTL. 
CHANGE 183, 184 (1998). 
 34. Id. 
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Early action is also an economically efficient means to smooth 
society’s transition into a carbon-capped world.35 Greenhouse gas 
emitters will bear transaction costs in adapting to any new regulatory 
regime.36 Market-based regulatory instruments, such as emissions 
trading, will lower the economic costs of regulation only if the 
transaction costs imposed upon regulated entities do not exceed other 
efficiency gains.37 Transaction costs of such systems include “search 
and information costs, negotiation costs, approval costs, [and] 
monitoring and enforcement costs.”38 Indeed, the level of transaction 
costs imposed upon regulated entities can heavily influence the 
success of an emissions trading scheme. Early experimentation in 
emissions reduction and trading helps reduce overall societal 
transaction costs by overcoming socioeconomic inertia to invest in 
emissions abatement39 and by providing society with a wealth of 
knowledge gained from “learning-by-doing.”40 
Such early action will only take place if greenhouse gas emitters 
have an incentive to reduce emissions prior to regulation. Emitters’ 
diminished effort levels reflect their uncertainty over their obligations 
within a future federal regulatory program.41 They hesitate to reduce 
their emissions prior to the enactment of legislation because if the 
program is not designed to recognize early emissions reductions, 
conscientious early actors will effectively be penalized relative to 
those that continue emitting at business-as-usual levels.42 Assurance 
that the future federal program will provide some level of recognition 
for early action is therefore necessary to encourage greenhouse gas 
emitters to begin reducing emissions prior to the effective date of the 
 
 35. Haoran Pan & Denise Van Regemorter, The Costs & Benefits of Early Action Before 
Kyoto Compliance, 32 ENERGY POL’Y 1477, 1478 (2004). 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id.; see also DANIEL J. DUDEK & JONATHAN BAERT WIENER, ORG. FOR ECON. 
COOPERATION AND DEV., JOINT IMPLEMENTATION, TRANSACTION COSTS, AND CLIMATE 
CHANGE 15 (1996), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/17/33/2392058.pdf (noting the 
transaction costs of alternative climate change policies). 
 39. Richard B. Stewart & Jonathan B. Wiener, The Comprehensive Approach to Global 
Climate Policy: Issues of Design and Practicability, 9 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 83, 111 (1992). 
 40. Pan & Regemorter, supra note 35, at 1478. 
 41. ROBERT R. NORDHAUS ET AL., ANALYSIS OF EARLY ACTION CREDITING PROPOSALS 
6 (1998), available at http://www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/pol%5Fearly%2Epdf. 
 42. See id.(“[M]any companies are concerned that current emissions reductions may not be 
recognized in a future regulatory program.”). 
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regulation and thereby smooth the transition of the economy and 
benefit the global environment.43 
For example, if the federal government adopts a cap-and-trade 
system for greenhouse gas emissions, it will place a cap on the 
nation’s total emissions for a given year and then allocate the 
emissions budget among regulated entities in the form of tradable 
permits. Entities covered by the program will only be allowed to emit 
a quantity of greenhouse gases equal to the amount of permits they 
hold. Because the number of permits is limited, a fundamental 
component of any such program is to determine how to allocate the 
permits among covered entities.44 Typically, permits are provided for 
free to emitters in an amount proportionate to their historical level of 
emissions during some period of time, called their “baseline.”45 The 
baseline of an entity regulated under a cap-and-trade system 
effectively defines that entity’s entitlement to valuable emissions 
rights, so emitters are quite concerned about the method by which it 
is set. 
Early emissions reducers have good reason to be especially 
concerned about their baselines. If a company achieved emissions 
reductions through voluntary programs at a time before the period 
that will determine its baseline, it will be allotted fewer permits than 
if it had continued doing business as usual.46 It will therefore have to 
accomplish even further reductions or purchase extra permits on the 
market to meet its compliance obligations. Taking into account the 
law of diminishing returns and the fact that the entity may have 
already picked the low-hanging fruit, early emissions reductions can 
lead to much higher marginal costs of compliance for regulated 
entities if they are ignored when setting an entity’s baseline. 
 
 43. Id. at 6. 
 44. Robert R. Nordhaus & Kyle W. Danish, Assessing the Options for Designing a 
Mandatory U.S. Greenhouse Gas Reduction Program, 32 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 97, 134–42 
(2005). 
 45. Inho Choi, Global Climate Change and the Use of Economic Approaches: The Ideal 
Design Features of Domestic Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading with an Analysis of the 
European Union’s CO2 Emissions Trading Directive and the Climate Stewardship Act, 45 NAT. 
RESOURCES J. 865, 920–21 (2005). 
 46. Axel Michaelowa & Marcus Stronzik, Early Crediting of Emissions Reductions—A 
Panacea or Pandora’s Box?, in EFFICIENCY AND EQUITY OF CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY 185, 
186 (Carlo Carraro ed., 2000). 
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Emitters of any substantial quantity of greenhouse gases are 
likely aware that early action may increase compliance costs.47 
Accordingly, if they are not able to predict how their baseline will be 
calculated under a future emissions regime, they will be less 
motivated to achieve early emissions reductions.48 Furthermore, if the 
baseline period is set to a time after early emissions reductions have 
taken place, an early actor’s compliance costs will be higher than an 
entity that undertakes no emissions reductions until regulation is in 
place.49 Because early actors help reduce overall emissions and 
transaction costs for society, punishing such behavior would be 
inequitable and inefficient.50 Setting a company’s baseline to a time 
before it achieves emissions reductions will move the emitter closer to 
meeting its emissions budget under a future cap, thereby producing a 
more equitable and more efficient result.51 
The effect of early emissions reductions on the total national 
permit budget also raises important questions of equity and 
efficiency. When a program allocates early action credits they must be 
subtracted from the total permit budget to ensure the integrity of the 
overall emissions cap.52 To illustrate, assume that the national cap for 
the compliance period is set at ten million metric tons of CO2 and that 
there are only two covered entities with identical historical baselines, 
so each is allocated five million metric tons. Assume further that 
Company A can prove with certainty that it reduced its emissions 
from a business-as-usual scenario by one million metric tons of CO2 
before the compliance period. If Company A is provided credit for its 
early reduction and thus allowed to emit six million metric tons of 
CO2, Company B’s permit allocation must be reduced to four million 
to ensure that the total emissions for Company A and B remain 
within the cap. Some have questioned the equity of redistributing 
permit allocations in favor of early actors in this way.53 
It is vital to note, however, that this hypothetical ignores the 
question of how the cap of ten million metric tons of CO2 was 
 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. at 185. 
 50. See supra notes 35–49 and accompanying text. 
 51. See Michaelowa & Stronzik, supra note 46, at 186 (“To encourage reductions prior to 
the first commitment period without risking a comparative disadvantage one could think of 
granting credits which can be used against future obligations.”). 
 52. Id. at 189–90. 
 53. Id. at 192–93. 
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derived. Assume that dangerous climate change will occur if the 
United States emits more than 200 million metric tons of CO2 over a 
twenty year period.54 Further assume that it took the United States 
ten years to develop a regulatory program, during which time 100 
million metric tons of CO2 were emitted into the atmosphere, leaving 
100 million available to be emitted during the second ten-year period. 
If Company A had not voluntarily reduced its emissions by 1 million 
metric tons prior to regulation, only 99 million would have been 
available at the start of the compliance period. Therefore, if the total 
emissions budget is simply set at 10 million per year and divided 
evenly between Companies A and B, Company B will receive a 
windfall of permits for one-half million metric tons of CO2. It will 
have proceeded with business as usual at the expense of Company A. 
If, on the other hand, a budget of 99 million metric tons is divided 
between Companies A and B, but Company A is also allowed to 
claim and use or sell permits equal to its early reductions, the total 
budget will remain the same but the benefits will inure solely to the 
early actor. 
The central argument against early action credit is that the 
emissions reductions claimed by corporations and other entities are of 
questionable credibility, and therefore providing credit for such 
reductions will unnecessarily reduce the amount of permits available 
to other entities and increase the overall societal costs of emissions 
reductions55 This argument carried greater force in the late 1990s, 
when greenhouse gas accounting and reporting procedures were in 
their infancy. In contrast, each of the four major greenhouse gas 
emissions reductions registries used in the United States56 is based 
 
 54. In reality, to stabilize atmospheric concentrations of carbon at less than twice 
preindustrial levels, total accumulated CO2 emissions between the years 2001 and 2100 must be 
reduced between 365 and 735 gigatons of carbon (GtC) and the emissions per year must fall 
below 1990 levels by 2040. PHILIBERT & PERSHING, supra note 31, at 25. What portion of this 
budget should be allocated to the United States is quite obviously a very controversial subject. 
 55. Raymond Kopp et al., A Proposal for Credible Early Action in U.S. Climate Policy, 
WEATHERVANE, Feb. 16, 1999, http://www.rff.org/~kopp/popular_articles/feature060.html 
(“[Early action crediting] risks distributing too many credits for questionable early reductions. 
The only way to reduce this risk is to thoroughly examine each project and evaluate the true 
reductions incurred—a cumbersome and potentially expensive administrative process.”). 
 56. Three of the four registries, the DOE’s 1605(b) Program, the Climate Leader’s 
Program, and the California Climate Action Registry, are discussed infra Part III. The fourth is 
the Eastern Climate Registry, which underlies the RGGI program. See EASTERN CLIMATE 
REGISTRY, EASTERN CLIMATE REGISTRY VOLUNTARY REPORTING REQUIREMENTS vi 
(2006), available at http://www.easternclimateregistry.org/documents/ECR%20Voluntary%20 
Reporting%20Requirements_Sept_2006.pdf. 
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upon a widely accepted protocol developed by the World Business 
Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD) and World 
Resources Institute (WRI) that ensures that reported reductions are 
real, verifiable, and additional.57 California and the RGGI’s registries 
will contain highly credible records of reductions achieved pursuant 
to state laws,58 and the DOE’s registration requirements under the 
1605(b) Program were revised in April of 2006 to “enhance the 
measurement accuracy, reliability and verifiability of information 
reported.”59 As long as credits are only available for emissions 
reductions registered under such advanced reporting programs, there 
is less need for concern that credits will be provided for nonadditional 
reductions, reductions that would have occurred in the absence of the 
program. 
Although arguments for the equity, efficiency, and 
environmental benefits of early action crediting provide no guarantee 
that such credit will ultimately be bestowed, it is highly likely that a 
future federal regulatory program will provide some form of valuable 
recognition for the achievements of early actors. With RGGI and 
California implementing mandatory emissions reductions programs 
that will cover large segments of the economy, hundreds of the 
nation’s most important companies participating in voluntary 
reductions programs, and accounting and verifiability methods 
increasing in accuracy, the case is simply too strong and the stakes too 
high not to give credit where credit is due. 
III.  THE LEGAL BASIS OF EARLY ACTION CREDIT 
The issue of providing legal entitlements for early emissions 
reductions first became an important topic of debate after the United 
States signed the Kyoto Protocol. Climate change commentators 
quickly realized that greenhouse gas emitters would have no legal 
assurance that a future federal regulatory regime would recognize or 
credit their early emissions reductions unless Congress explicitly 
 
 57. WORLD RES. INST., THE GREENHOUSE GAS PROTOCOL: A CORPORATE 
ACCOUNTING AND REPORTING STANDARD 4 (Rev. Ed., 2004), available at 
http://pdf.wri.org/ghg_protocol_2004.pdf. 
 58. California Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006, Assemb. B. No. 32 (to be codified at 
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38530 (2006)); Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, Model 
Rule, Subpart XX-8 (2007), http://www.rggi.org/modelrule.htm (last visited Mar. 25, 2007). 
 59. Guidelines for Voluntary Greenhouse Gas Reporting, 71 Fed. Reg. 20,784, 20,785 
(Apr. 21, 2006) (codified at 10 C.F.R. § 300.1 (2006)). 
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provided for it by statute.60 Several nonprofit organizations offered 
proposals regarding early action credits, and a number of legislators 
introduced bills regarding early action credits in Congress.61 
Ultimately, no early action legislation was passed and the topic died 
along with the prospect of implementing the Kyoto Protocol when the 
United States withdrew from the treaty in 2001.62 With the recent 
revival of federal interest in climate change regulation, the debate 
over creating legal entitlements for early actors has begun to 
resurface. This section identifies the current lack of a legal basis for 
providing early action credit and discusses the use of voluntary 
emissions registries as a means of increasing the future verifiability of 
present emissions reductions. 
Congress could provide credit for early emissions reductions 
either prospectively or retroactively. Under a prospective approach, 
legislation would create legal entitlements for current emissions 
reductions that could be used once a federal cap-and-trade program is 
enacted. Alternatively, Congress could wait until it enacts a cap-and-
trade program and include provisions that award credits retroactively 
for past emissions reductions. A prospective approach is preferable 
because it provides greater certainty to emitters and therefore 
stimulates more early emissions reductions. Unfortunately, it also 
requires Congress to act under the assumption that a future emissions 
cap will be enacted, which makes it less politically viable than the 
retroactive approach.63 
The only piece of prospective early action credit legislation 
introduced in the 109th Congress was the Climate Change 
Technology Deployment and Infrastructure Credit Act of 2005.64 
Senator Chuck Hagel introduced this bill to amend the Energy Policy 
Act of 1992.65 The original version contained provisions that would 
 
 60. See NORDHAUS ET AL., supra note 41, at 18 (“If [an early action credit] program is to 
have binding effect, then it will have to be authorized by law.”). 
 61. See, e.g., S. 547, 106th Cong. (1999) (authorizing the provision of regulatory credit for 
voluntary early greenhouse gas emissions); H.R. 2520, 106th Cong. (1999) (same). 
 62. The United States withdrew from the Kyoto Protocol in 2001 after George W. Bush 
became president. See Greg Kahn, Note, The Fate of the Kyoto Protocol Under the Bush 
Administration, 21 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 548, 549–56 (2003) (chronicling the events leading up 
to and the Bush administration’s reasons for withdrawing from the treaty). 
 63. See NORDHAUS ET AL., supra note 41, at 17–21 (summarizing approaches that Congress 
could take to provide early action credit). 
 64. Climate Change Technology Deployment and Infrastructure Credit Act of 2005, S. 388, 
109th Cong. (2005). 
 65. Id. 
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have provided the DOE with legal authority to issue early emissions 
reduction credits.66 Specifically, in section 1612 the bill provided the 
secretary of energy with authority to enter into “voluntary 
agreements” with entities willing to report and reduce their 
emissions.67 The act stated that the Secretary “shall” provide 
transferable credits to such an entity with “certified emissions 
reductions relative to [their] baseline level that . . . shall be applicable 
toward any incentive, market-based, or regulatory program 
determined by Congress to be necessary and feasible to reduce the 
risk of climate change and effects of climate change.”68 These 
provisions sparked some controversy among groups opposed to 
federal action on climate change,69 and Senator Hagel subsequently 
introduced another version lacking the early action credit provisions.70 
Neither bill made it out of committee.71 
Federal and state agencies administering voluntary emissions 
reporting and reduction programs have provided some indication that 
a future federal regulatory program could recognize early 
reductions.72 In relation to the DOE’s 1605(b) Program, the DOE 
Guidelines for Voluntary Greenhouse Gas Reporting provide that if 
an entity meets all the registration requirements for emissions 
reductions, the Energy Information Administration will notify it that 
the reductions have been “credited” as “registered reductions” that 
can be held “for use (including transfer to other entities) in the event 
a future program that recognizes such reductions is enacted into 
law.”73 This provision provides no legal claim to early emissions 
credits without subsequent action by Congress. It does, however, 
 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. § 1612(a)(6). 
 68. Id. § 1612(e)(1)(D). 
 69. Letter from Marlo Lewis, Jr., Competitive Enterprise Institute, to Senator Domenici, 
Chairman, Comm. on Energy & Natural Res. (Mar. 22, 2005), http://www.cei.org/gencon/ 
019,04447.cfm (last visited Mar. 18, 2007). 
 70. See Climate Change Technology Deployment and Infrastructure Credit Act of 2005, S. 
887, 109th Cong. (2005) (containing no early action credit provisions). 
 71. The Library of Congress THOMAS, http://www.thomas.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d109: 
SN00388:@@@L&summ2=m& (last visited Mar. 19, 2007) (tracking the first version); The 
Library of Congress THOMAS, http://www.thomas.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d109:SN00887:@@@ 
L&summ2=m& (last visited Mar. 19, 2007) (tracking the second version). 
 72. See, e.g., Voluntary Greenhouse Gas Reporting: General Guidelines, 10 C.F.R. § 300.12 
(2006) (referencing the possibility that a future federal regulatory program would recognize 
early action credits). 
 73. Id. 
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express the DOE’s confidence that the standards and procedures 
contained in its newly revised reporting guidelines have progressed to 
a level where emissions reductions can be recorded with sufficient 
accuracy to warrant allocation of entitlements. 
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) also administers a 
voluntary emissions reporting and reduction program called Climate 
Leaders.74 The Climate Leaders program documentation only 
indirectly intimates that registered reductions may evolve into credits 
in the future.75 It defines a greenhouse gas “credit” as “a convertible 
and transferable instrument usually bestowed by a [greenhouse gas] 
program”76 and specifically points out that “future financial 
accounting standards may treat [greenhouse gas] emissions as 
liabilities and emissions allowances/credits as assets.”77 The program, 
however, provides no indication that future federal regulations will 
credit or recognize emissions reductions properly registered 
according to its guidelines. Despite the program’s silence on the 
subject, it is clear that at least some participants expect that their 
efforts may be convertible into some form of credit in the future.78 
A third voluntary greenhouse gas emissions registry is the 
California Climate Action Registry, which the state established in 
2000.79 California created the registry in part “[t]o ensure that 
participating organizations receive appropriate consideration for 
certified emissions results under any future state, federal or 
international regulatory regime relating to [greenhouse gas] 
emissions.”80 To this end, “[t]he State of California has promised to 
 
 74. Climate Leaders, FACT SHEET (U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency), Mar. 2007, at 1–2, 
available at http://www.epa.gov/stateply/docs/partnership_fact_sheet.pdf. 
 75. See generally U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, CLIMATE LEADERS GREENHOUSE 
GAS INVENTORY PROTOCOL: DESIGN PRINCIPLES 5 (2005) (explaining how disclosure leads to 
more effective management, thereby increasing the likelihood of greater program efficiency). 
 76. Id. at 83. 
 77. Id. at 11. 
 78. For example, Frito-Lay, Inc. states on the Climate Leaders website: “Realizing that 
GHG reductions represent a corporate asset that the company wanted to protect, Frito-Lay 
chose a highly transparent, rigorous, and credible reporting process . . . . Frito-Lay also believes 
it is important to register its GHG emission reductions to allow the company to take credit for 
its accomplishments in the event that tougher regulations are enacted in the future.” EPA, 
Climate Leaders, Partners, http://www.epa.gov/climateleaders/partners/partners/fritolayinc.html 
(last visited Feb. 23, 2007). 
 79. CAL. CLIMATE ACTION REGISTRY, GEN. REPORTING PROTOCOL pt. 1, 2 (2003), 
available at http://www.climateregistry.org/docs/PROTOCOLS/General%20Reporting%20 
Protocol%20DRAFT%20Oct03.pdf. 
 80. Id. 
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use its best efforts to ensure that reported emissions receive 
appropriate consideration in the event of future [greenhouse gas] 
regulation.”81 Although there is no reason to doubt that California 
will honor this promise in good faith, its commitment is less than 
legally binding upon it or the federal government. 
Because early actors lack any prospective legal commitment to 
receive credit for present emissions reductions, they must rely upon 
the verifiability of their reductions and a retroactive provision of 
credit by future congressional legislation. A company’s ability to 
ensure that its emissions reductions are verifiable is complicated by 
the fact that there are several independent state and federal systems 
for accounting for and reporting emissions reductions. Although each 
of the four major greenhouse gas emissions reductions registries is 
based upon WBCSD-WRI protocol,82 there are differences among the 
registries that could affect the provision of credit under future federal 
legislation. 
The DOE’s 1605(b) Program, for example, distinguishes between 
emissions that are merely “reported” and those that are 
“registered.”83 Only emissions that are “registered” are eligible for 
credit under a future regulatory program,84 and so must meet more 
stringent accounting requirements than those that are merely 
“reported.” Each reporting entity must establish an emissions 
inventory that accounts for its direct, indirect, and sequestered 
emissions for a specified year.85 The DOE’s Technical Guidelines for 
the program identify various emissions estimation methods and assign 
each a numerical rank: 4.0 (for A-rated methods) to 1.0 (for D-rated 
methods).86 Those wishing to register emissions reductions must use 
estimation methods to produce their emissions inventory that achieve 
an average score of 3.0.87 Alternatively, they can have their emissions 
inventory independently verified by a qualified auditor.88 Reporting 
entities must calculate their registered emissions reductions with 
 
 81. Id. 
 82. See supra note 57 and accompanying text. 
 83. Voluntary Greenhouse Gas Reporting Program: General Guidelines, 10 C.F.R. § 
300.1(b)–(c) (2006). 
 84. Id. § 300.12. 
 85. Id. § 300.6. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
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reference to a baseline year no earlier than 1996 and must achieve 
them no earlier than 2002.89 
California’s registry is quite different than the DOE’s. It makes 
no distinction between reported and registered emissions reductions. 
Rather, an entity must calculate its inventory of emissions for any 
given year using specified methodologies for each type of emissions 
producing activity.90 The entity must then have its calculations 
certified by an approved third-party.91 An entity’s baseline for 
calculating emissions reductions can be any year, starting with 1990, 
for which a certified emissions inventory exists.92 
Because of the differences in methodologies used to estimate 
emissions, certification requirements, and baseline restrictions, 
emissions that qualify for registration under 1605(b) may not be 
recognized under California’s system, and vice versa. For instance, 
emissions reductions achieved from 1990 through 2001 can be 
registered under California’s system, but not under the 1605(b) 
Program.93 In contrast, emissions reductions receiving an average B 
quality rating, and therefore registrable under the 1605(b) Program, 
may not be registered under California’s program if the prescribed 
methods were not used or if the reductions were not independently 
certified.94 Early emissions reducers therefore must choose between 
incurring the cost of complying with more than one registry’s 
requirements, or identifying the single registry that maximizes their 
chances for future recognition of emissions reductions. On the one 
hand, the data contained in California’s registry is highly credible 
because of its stringent registration requirements and its breadth of 
coverage.95 On the other hand, given that the 1605(b) Program was 
revised specifically to increase the verifiability of registered emissions 
reductions96 and now includes a provision on potential future credit, it 
 
 89. Id. § 300.5(b)(1)–(2). 
 90. CAL. CLIMATE ACTION REGISTRY, supra note 79, at pt. 1, 17. 
 91. Id. at pt. 1, 18. 
 92. Id. at pt. 3, 2. 
 93. Id. (allowing registration of reductions from 1990 to 2001); see also Voluntary 
Greenhouse Gas Reporting: General Guidelines, 10 C.F.R. § 300.1(c)(1) (2006) (“To be eligible 
for registration, a reduction must [generally] have been achieved after 2002.”). 
 94. CAL. CLIMATE ACTION REGISTRY, supra note 79, at pt. 1, 2. 
 95. See id. at pt. 1, 2–4 (describing the California registry’s requirements and coverage). 
 96. See source cited supra note 59 and accompanying text. 
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would be a mistake to forego participation in this federal registry.97 As 
the next Part will show, choosing between registries is but one of 
many concerns for greenhouse gas emitters seeking to realize the 
benefits of their early reduction efforts through retroactive crediting 
legislation. 
IV.  CREDIT FOR PAST REDUCTIONS IN PROPOSED CLIMATE 
CHANGE LEGISLATION 
Certain design elements of a mandatory greenhouse gas 
emissions cap will determine whether and to what extent early 
emissions reducers can claim credit for their past emissions 
reductions. This Part first identifies those design elements and then 
proceeds to describe and evaluate how four leading legislative 
proposals have addressed early action credit. 
A. Design Elements of the Future Carbon Cap 
Federal legislation could place a number of restrictions on the 
provision of credit for early emissions reductions. Such legislation 
could, for example, provide credit only for reductions achieved during 
a specified period, or limit how many credits a covered entity can use 
to meet its compliance obligations.98 A future federal cap-and-trade 
system’s method for calculating entity baselines and allocating the 
overall emissions budget will also affect early actors’ emissions-
related entitlements.99 Choice of registry is also significant to early 
actors because future congressional legislation may restrict which 
registries’ emissions reductions will receive credit.100 Table 1 and the 
following discussion summarize the importance of various aspects of 
cap-and-trade systems to early emissions reducers.101 
 
 97. See id. § 300.12 (referencing the possibility that a future federal regulatory program 
would recognize early action credits). 
 98. Regulations that cap the amount of early action credit that can be applied to 
compliance obligations do so presumably to mitigate the effect that such credit has on the 
overall emissions cap. However, as explained in Part II, this is an inequitable transfer of benefits 
from early actors to organizations that proceed with business-as-usual. 
 99. See supra Part II. 
 100. See infra Part IV.B. 
 101. Table 1 summarizes factors already introduced in Parts I–III of this Note. It also 
summarizes several new factors that will be introduced in Part IV. A comprehensive treatment 
of each factor is beyond the scope of this Note. Attention is drawn to these factors to alert the 
reader to their importance in evaluating future climate change legislation. 
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Table 1.  Elements of Future Greenhouse Gas Regulation Affecting 
Early Actors and Their Importance 
Factor Importance to Early Actors 
Credit for early reductions To encourage early emissions reductions, legislation 
should expressly provide early emissions 
reduction credits and should not impose 
percentage limits on their use. 
The emissions reduction registration method must 
ensure verifiability without needlessly restricting 
eligibility for credit. 
Baseline calculation 
method 
Calculation method should allow setting entities’ 
baselines to some year before emissions 
reductions were achieved. 
Allocation of overall 
emissions cap 
Cap should not indirectly include verified emissions 
reductions attributable to early actors or, if it 




Early actors should concentrate on gases covered by 
a future regulatory regime. 
Greenhouse gases with higher global warming 
potentials may yield more credits. 
Provisions on offsets To encourage early investment in third party 
emissions reductions, legislation should provide 
credit for verifiable offsets and should not impose 
percentage limitations on their use. 
Early actors should note restrictions on project types 
(sequestration, destruction) and locations 
(domestic, international). 
6.Covered entities Entities inside cap should invest in reductions to 
bank for future compliance. 
Entities outside cap should seek investment from 
entities inside the cap and sell offsets. 
 
Another consideration is which greenhouse gases will be covered 
by the regulation. There are six major greenhouse gases covered by 
domestic emissions registries: (1) carbon dioxide (CO2), (2) methane 
(CH4), (3) nitrous oxide (N2O), (4) hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), (5) 
perfluorocarbons (PFCs), and (6) sulfur hexafluoride (SF6).
102 Early 
emissions reductions in greenhouse gases that are not covered by 
 
 102. CAL. CLIMATE ACTION REGISTRY, supra note 79, at xiv. 
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future regulation will not yield credits. More significantly, each 
greenhouse gas has a different degree of effect upon global warming, 
called a “global warming potential.”103 Assuming that Congress 
chooses to regulate gases with higher global warming potentials more 
stringently, reducing emissions of such gases could yield more credits. 
Entities considering whether to reduce their greenhouse gas 
emissions should also consider what kinds of emitters the proposed 
regulations will cover. Based upon industry segment, quantity of 
emissions, and other factors, each regulation will separate all 
greenhouse gas emitters into two groups—those that fall inside and 
those that fall outside of the cap. Entities within the cap will want to 
seek credits that they can apply toward their permit budget, whereas 
entities outside the cap could potentially sell credits to entities within 
the cap. For example, if a proposed cap-and-trade system caps 
emissions from electric power generators but not from agricultural 
sources, electric power generators could purchase the rights to 
emissions reductions achieved by agricultural sources. The availability 
of this strategy depends, however, on the provision of “offset” credits 
within the cap-and-trade system. 
Entities can also reduce emissions within their own operations by 
improving energy efficiency or changing industrial processes 
(“ordinary emissions reductions”).104 Alternatively, an entity can 
contract with outside actors to achieve greenhouse gas reductions 
(“offsets”). A simple example would be to pay another company to 
reduce its emissions and acquire the legal rights to those reductions 
by contract. These are sometimes referred to as “off-system” 
reductions,105 but are more commonly known as “offsets”106 because a 
company is not actually reducing its own emissions, but rather 
offsetting them with reductions elsewhere that are equally beneficial 
to the global atmosphere. A cap-and-trade system can encourage 
corporations to begin investing in reductions by third parties by 
providing credit for offset reductions achieved before implementation 
of the cap. 
 
 103. The “global warming potential” of a given greenhouse gas is defined as “[t]he ratio of 
radiative forcing (degree of harm to the atmosphere) that would result from the emission of one 
unit of a given [greenhouse gas] to one unit of CO2.” Id. 
 104. HOFFMAN, supra note 17, at 16. 
 105. Id. at 18. 
 106. Voluntary Greenhouse Gas Reporting Program: General Guidelines, 10 C.F.R. § 300.2 
(2006) (“Offset means an emission reduction that [is included in a 1605(b) report and] meets the 
requirements of this part, but is achieved by a party other than the reporting entity.”). 
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Measurement and verification of offsets is not necessarily 
different from ordinary emissions reductions; they can consist of the 
exact same activity with the exact same resultant reduction in 
greenhouse gas emissions. The off-site location of the reduction, 
however, typically causes most regulatory schemes to treat offsets 
differently than ordinary emissions reductions to ensure that a net 
reduction in emissions has actually taken place.107 For example, where 
international offsets are allowed in a country that has not capped its 
overall greenhouse gas emissions, there is a risk that emissions 
reductions achieved by one entity will simply result in an increase in 
emissions by another entity, resulting in no net emissions reduction. 
Regulations therefore place restrictions on the location of offsets, 
specify verification procedures for offset reductions, and limit the 
amount of the compliance obligation that can be met through offset 
credits. 
B. Early Action Credit Provisions in Four Senate Bills 
Each of these design elements takes a different form in the cap-
and-trade systems that have been proposed in the Senate. This 
Section introduces and explains four of the most noteworthy 
proposed programs.108 The next Section evaluates these bills in terms 
of equity and effectiveness in inducing early emissions reductions 
through early action credit. 
1. The McCain-Lieberman “Climate Stewardship and 
Innovation Act of 2005.”109  In 2003, Senators John McCain and 
Joseph Lieberman introduced this bill, which was defeated by a 
relatively narrow vote of 55 to 43. It was reintroduced as the “Climate 
Stewardship and Innovation Act” in 2005 and was again defeated, but 
 
 107. See Choi, supra note 45, at 934–40 (describing offset activities and explaining the 
attendant inventory, monitoring, and verification problems). 
 108. In addition to the bills discussed below, Senator Feinstein has announced and 
circulated a draft bill entitled “The Strong Economy and Climate Protection Act.” Although it 
is widely believed that Senator Feinstein will introduce this bill in the 110th Congress, the bill 
itself was not publicly available for review at the time of writing this Note. A general outline of 
its provisions is available on the Senator’s website. Sen. Diane Feinstein, Senator Feinstein 
Outlines New Legislation to Curb Global Warming, Keep Economy Strong (Mar. 20, 2006), 
http://www.feinstein.senate.gov/06releases/r-global-warm320.htm (last visited Mar. 18, 2007). 
 109. Climate Stewardship and Innovation Act of 2005, S. 1151, 109th Cong. (2005). 
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by a somewhat wider margin, 60 to 38.110 Senator John McCain has 
stated that he intends to introduce the bill for a third time and 
believes that chances are “pretty good” that it could pass in the 110th 
Congress.111 
The Climate Stewardship Act proposed capping greenhouse gas 
emissions by covered entities after the year 2010 at less than “5896 
million metric tons,” measured in carbon dioxide equivalents.112 This 
capped emissions at 1990 levels in accordance with the UNFCCC’s 
Article 4,113 as well as its Article 2 goal of preventing “dangerous 
anthropogenic interference with the climate system.”114 To ensure the 
adequacy of the cap in meeting this goal, the Act called on the 
secretary of commerce to review it biennially.115 It defined greenhouse 
gas emissions to include all six major greenhouse gases.116 The Act’s 
cap included all entities in the electric power, industrial, or 
commercial sectors of the economy that emitted 10,000 metric tons of 
greenhouse gases per year.117 It also included all refiners or importers 
of petroleum products for transportation, and all producers or 
importers of HFCs, PFCs, and SF6 that emitted more than 10,000 
metric tons of greenhouse gases per year upon consumption.118 
Noticeably absent was any inclusion of emissions from the 
agricultural sector. 
The Act had extensive early emissions reductions provisions. It 
proposed the creation of a new National Greenhouse Gas Emissions 
 
 110. Pamela Najor, McCain-Lieberman Amendment Fails Again on Senate Floor in Second 
Try in Two Years, 36 ENV’T REP. (BNA) 1277 (2005). It is noteworthy that Senator Boxer voted 
for the bill in 2003 but against it in 2005 because of the inclusion of provisions on nuclear energy 
in the bill. 151 CONG. REC. S7018 (2005) (statement of Sen. Boxer) (“I wish that I could support 
the McCain-Lieberman amendment, as I did 2 years ago. But by making the nuclear industry 
eligible for yet more subsidies, as a matter of principle, I cannot vote for this year's version.”).  
Senator Boxer now chairs the Senate Environment & Public Works Committee. Senator Boxer 
Reorganizes Environment Panel, Naming Two Global Warming Subcommittees, 37 ENV’T REP. 
(BNA) 46 (2006). 
 111. Amena H. Saiyid, McCain, Lieberman to Reintroduce Bill Requiring Reductions in 
Greenhouse Gases, 37 ENV’T REP. (BNA) 2382 (2006). Senator McCain made this 
announcement on November 16, 2006, at the opening of the Washington, D.C., office of Duke 
University’s Nicholas Institute for Environmental Policy Solutions. Id. 
 112. S. 1151 § 331(a)(1). 
 113. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, supra note 32, art. 4. 
 114. Id. art. 2. 
 115. S. 1151 § 334(a)(3). 
 116. Id. § 3(9). 
 117. Id. § 3(5)(B). 
 118. Id. § 3(5)(A)–(B). 
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Database.119 The Database was to include emissions reductions 
achieved by regulated entities after 1990 and before 2010, and 
achieved by unregulated entities at any time after 1990.120 Under the 
Act, entities had four years from the enactment of the law to register 
emissions reductions achieved before the establishment of the 
national database.121 
To register an emissions reduction, the Act required an entity to 
establish a baseline and report to the administrator all of its 
greenhouse gas emissions for each year in which reductions took 
place.122 The Act did not specify a methodology for calculating an 
entity’s baseline. It simply defined “baseline” as “the historic 
greenhouse gas emissions levels of an entity,” but qualified that the 
administrator would adjust the baseline upward “to reflect actual 
reductions that [were] verified” according to the relevant 
regulations.123 The administrator was to review the entity’s report to 
ensure that it indicated “actual reductions in direct greenhouse gas 
emissions” relative to the entity’s historic emissions levels, “after 
accounting for any increases in indirect emissions.”124 The methods 
and standards used in this review would have been promulgated by 
the administrator through rulemaking in coordination with the 
secretary of energy and the secretary of agriculture.125 
The Act required that the administrator first allocate permits to 
entities that had registered emissions reductions in the national 
database prior to the first year that compliance was mandated, which 
was 2010. If an entity elected to use a registered, pre-2010 emissions 
reduction to comply with its budget in a given year, the Act directed 
the administrator to award the entity with permits equal to those 
registered reductions and to subtract that amount from the total 
permit budget for the year.126 Entities covered by state mandatory 
greenhouse gas reduction programs would also have been entitled to 
priority allocation of permits if the state’s program was at least as 
 
 119. Id. § 201–04. 
 120. Id. § 203(a)(1)–(2). 
 121. Id. § 203(c)(2)(B)(i). 
 122. Id. § 203(c)(1). 
 123. Id. § 3(2). 
 124. Id. § 203(c)(3)(A)–(B). 
 125. Id. § 204(a)(1). 
 126. Id. § 335(a)(1)(A)–(C). 
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stringent as that created by the Act.127 Any permits remaining after 
the early actors’ elections had been satisfied would have been 
distributed according to a process created by the administrator. The 
bill specifically instructed the administrator to ensure that the process 
would “not penalize a covered entity for emissions reductions made 
before 2010 and registered with the database,”128 and to consider 
“binding state actions in making the final determination of 
allocation[s]” to covered entities.129 
Finally, the Act allowed covered entities to meet 15 percent of 
their compliance obligations through offsets.130 These included credits 
obtained from another nation’s markets for greenhouse gas 
emissions, credits from a registered net increase in carbon 
sequestration by another entity, and credits from emissions 
reductions registered in the database by entities not covered under 
the Act.131 
2. The Bingaman “Climate and Economy Insurance Act of 
2005.”132  Senator Jeff Bingaman, chairman of the Senate Energy and 
Natural Resources Committee, initially drafted this act as an 
amendment to the Energy Policy Act of 2005, but it was never 
introduced. The senator intends to introduce climate change 
legislation, believing that it would be a mistake to wait until President 
George W. Bush’s second term ends in 2008 to create a federal cap-
and-trade system.133 
Rather than placing an absolute cap on total greenhouse gas 
emissions, this Act set an emissions cap based upon “emissions 
intensity,” which was to be calculated by dividing the total 
greenhouse gas emissions for all covered entities in the United States 
by the Gross Domestic Product (GDP).134 Using the intensity metric 
for 2009 as a starting point, the Act required a 2.4 percent reduction 
in emissions intensity for covered sectors of the United States 
 
 127. Id. § 335(b). 
 128. Id. § 333(b)(3). 
 129. Id. § 333(h). 
 130. Id. § 302(b). 
 131. Id. § 302(b)(1)–(3). 
 132. 151 CONG. REC. S7090–98, (daily ed. June 22, 2005) (proposing an amendment, the 
Climate and Economy Insurance Act of 2005, to H.R. 6, 109th Cong. (2005)). 
 133. Dean Scott, U.S. PIRG Report Says Bingaman’s Approach Would Do Little to Halt 
Increased Emissions, 37 ENV’T REP. (BNA) 547 (2006). 
 134. 151 CONG. REC. at S7090 (proposing § 1512(4)). 
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economy for each year between 2010 and 2019.135 The total permit 
budget for each year was calculated by multiplying the emissions 
intensity target for that year by the projected GDP.136 The Act would 
have covered emissions of all six major greenhouse gases.137 It 
targeted CO2 emissions by regulating fuel distributors, cement and 
lime producers, and aluminum smelters without a minimum quantity 
of emissions threshold.138 Manufacturers and importers of HFCs, 
PFCs, SF6, and N2O also would have been regulated regardless of how 
much they emitted.139 Only coal mines were subject to an emissions 
threshold; mines would have been included within the cap only if they 
emitted more than 35 million cubic feet of CH4 in 2004.
140 
The Act directed the secretary of energy to devise a system to 
allocate permits to regulated entities and “affected nonregulated 
entities” based on their historical emissions levels, the “mitigation of 
significant and disproportionate burdens,” and the avoidance of 
“windfalls.”141 It required the program to include a means of 
allocating credits for early emissions reductions to any entity that 
reported its reductions under the DOE’s 1605(b) Program, the EPA’s 
Climate Leaders Program, or a state or privately administered 
registry.142 Permits for early emissions reductions, however, were 
limited to 1 percent of the year’s total allowance allocation.143 
Under the Act, certain specified offset activities would have 
produced credits that regulated entities could purchase to meet their 
compliance obligations. Within the United States, credits were to be 
allocated to entities for sequestering CO2 or destroying HFCs, PFCs, 
SF6, or N2O before it was emitted.
144 The Act provided no limitation 
on the amount of such credits that a regulated entity could submit in 
lieu of permits. It also directed the secretary of energy to establish a 
program for crediting offsets from international projects.145 The Act 
allowed regulated entities to submit credits earned from international 
 
 135. Id. (proposing § 1513(a)(1)–(2)). 
 136. Id. (proposing § 1513(a)(3)). 
 137. Id. (proposing § 1512(6)). 
 138. Id. (proposing § 1512(8), (12)). 
 139. Id. (proposing § 1512(8)). 
 140. Id. (proposing § 1512(8)). 
 141. Id. at S7091 (proposing § 1514(a)(4)). 
 142. Id. at S7093 (proposing § 1520(c)). 
 143. Id. at S7091 (proposing § 1514(c)). 
 144. Id. at S7092 (proposing § 1518(2), (5)). 
 145. Id. at S7093 (proposing § 1519(d)). 
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offsets projects only to meet a specific percentage of their compliance 
obligation, starting at 3 percent in 2010 and rising gradually to 10 
percent in 2020.146 
3. The Carper “Clean Air Planning Act of 2006.”147  The content 
of Senator Tom Carper’s bill was not strictly limited to climate 
change, but rather proposed a number of emissions regulations to 
reduce pollution from power plants.148 The bill nevertheless included 
substantial provisions outlining a trading system for CO2 emissions. It 
capped only CO2 emissions, leaving other greenhouse gases 
uncapped.149 It also only capped emissions from fossil fuel-fired 
facilities that generated electricity for sale and had the capacity to 
produce more than 25 megawatts.150 Under Senator Carper’s bill, the 
cap for CO2 in 2010 equaled the total emissions from covered entities 
in 2006.151 In 2015, the cap would have been lowered to 2001 emissions 
levels.152 The Act specified the method by which the EPA 
administrator was to allocate emissions permits to covered entities. 
The total quantity of permits allocated in a given year was first to be 
reduced by a certain amount to create a “new unit reserve” and a 
reserve to provide incentives for advanced clean coal technology.153 
The Act then allocated the remaining permits to covered entities 
according to their proportionate share of total electricity generation 
in the United States during the prior three years.154 
Although the cap only applied to CO2 emissions, the Act 
instructed the administrator to promulgate regulations to provide 
credit for offsets and early reductions of all six major greenhouse 
gases.155 Early reduction credits would have been available for 
greenhouse gas emissions reductions or sequestration projects that 
took place in the United States between the year 2000 and 2010, and 
 
 146. Id. at S7091 (proposing § 1514(c)). 
 147. Clean Air Planning Act of 2006, S. 2724, 109th Cong. (2006). 
 148. Steven D. Cook, Carper Reintroduces Bill to Cut Emissions from Power Plants, 
Including Carbon Dioxide, 37 ENV’T REP. (BNA) 937 (2006). 
 149. S. 2724 § 701(1)(B). 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. § 705(c)(1). 
 152. Id. § 705(c)(2). 
 153. Id. § 705(f)(2)(B). 
 154. Id. § 705(f)(2)(A). 
 155. Id. § 705(g)(1), (h)(1). “Greenhouse gas” is defined to include all six major greenhouse 
gases. Id. § 701(6). See supra text accompanying note 102 (identifying the six gases). 
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that were reported under the DOE’s 1605(b) Program or a state or 
regional greenhouse gas registry.156 Though the Act did not make 
clear how those credits were to fit into the specified permit allocation 
procedures, it stated that they were not to exceed 10 percent of the 
cap for 2011.157 This implies that early reduction credits would have 
either been added to or subtracted from the overall emissions cap. 
The Act was also ambiguous about whether early reduction credits 
would have been available for years after 2011, perhaps leaving this to 
the discretion of the administrator. 
Under Senator Carper’s plan, offset credits were available for 
projects that achieved reductions that were “real, surplus, 
enforceable, verifiable, permanent,” and that were monitored, 
reported, and verified in accordance with the administrator’s 
regulations.158 The administrator’s regulations were to consider offsets 
issued by California, RGGI, or any other state with a comparable 
offset program.159 The Act contained no limits on the amount of 
credits from offsets projects that a covered entity could use to meet its 
compliance obligations. 
4. The Kerry-Snowe “Global Warming Reduction Act of 
2006.”160  Senators John Kerry and Olympia J. Snowe introduced this 
bill in October of 2006, just before Congress’s recess.161 It is the least 
specific plan considered in this Note, leaving a great deal of discretion 
to the EPA administrator. It placed a cap on emissions of the six 
major greenhouse gases in the United States, requiring a 1.5 percent 
reduction from 2000 levels in 2010, a 2.5 percent reduction from 2000 
levels in 2020, and a 3.5 percent reduction from 2000 levels in 2030.162 
Under the Act, the administrator had full discretion to decide which 
sectors of the economy were to be responsible for achieving this cap, 
subject only to the requirement that covered sectors be those with the 
greatest emissions and the most cost-effective opportunities for 
 
 156. S. 2724 § 705(h)(1)–(2). 
 157. Id. § 705(h)(3). 
 158. Id. § 705(g)(2)(B), (D). 
 159. Id. § 705(g)(3). 
 160. Global Warming Reduction Act of 2006, S. 4039, 109th Cong. (2006). 
 161. Darren Samuelsohn, Sens. Kerry, Snowe Introduce Global Warming Bill, E&E NEWS 
PM, Oct. 3, 2006 (on file with the Duke Law Journal), available at http://www.eenews.net/ 
eenewspm/print/2006/10/03/2 (last visited Mar. 17, 2007). 
 162. S. 4039 § 702(b)(1). 
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reductions.163 The president, in consultation with the administrator, 
was to create a plan to allocate permits to covered entities. The Act 
explicitly would have forbidden the plan from resulting in windfall 
profits to any covered entity and required it to be approved by 
Congress.164 The contours of the emissions trading program, such as 
potential credit for early emissions reductions or offsets, was left to 
the discretion of the administrator.165 
C. Evaluation of Early Action Credit Provisions in Four Senate Bills 
Each of the four bills discussed in this Note incorporated 
different design elements that would have affected early emissions 
reducers’ ability to claim credit for their past emissions reductions. 
Table 2 summarizes the differences between each of these proposed 
cap-and-trade systems.166 
Of the four proposals, the McCain-Lieberman Climate 
Stewardship and Innovation Act of 2005 was by far the most 
favorable to early emissions reducers. The bill ensured that entities 
that proceeded with business as usual would not reap the benefits of 
early reducers’ efforts. It did so by giving priority allocation of 
permits to entities with registered early emissions reductions,167 and 
by requiring an entity’s baseline to be set in a manner that would not 
penalize it for early reductions.168 The Act also provided early 
reducers in all registries with a fair chance to prove that their early 
emissions reductions were real and verified. This was accomplished 
by directing the EPA administrator to create a new registry and to 
consult with the DOE about methods for verifying the accuracy of the 
information.169 The Act further instructed the administrator to 
consider emissions reductions achieved under mandatory state and 
regional programs.170 Emissions achieved as far back as 1990 were  
 
 
 163. Id. § 703(b). 
 164. Id. § 703(d). 
 165. Id. § 703(a). 
 166. Table 2 omits the citations to each of the bills’ provisions, which can be found in Part 
IV.B. 
 167. See supra Part IV.B.1. 
 168. Climate Stewardship and Innovation Act of 2005, S. 1151, 109th Cong. § 335 (2005). 
 169. Id. § 201. 
 170. Id. § 333(h). 
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eligible for credit.171 Finally, the Act’s offset provisions encouraged  
climate friendly investment by allowing regulated entities to purchase 
credits from unregulated entities that achieved emissions reductions 
before 2010.  
The Bingaman Climate and Economy Insurance Act of 2005 
contained two improvements to the McCain-Lieberman Act. It 
explicitly stated that participants in state and even private registries, 
such as the Chicago Climate Exchange,172 could receive credit for their 
early emissions reductions.173 It also required the creation of a system 
for recognizing and crediting offsets achieved overseas.174 However, 
the value of achieving early reductions was severely hampered by 
several aspects of the Act. It restricted the amount of credit that an 
entity could use in a given year to 1 percent of its compliance 
obligation.175 Furthermore, if a company invested in a project that 
achieved emissions reductions before the start of the program, it 
would have been entitled to use only a small percentage of the credits 
produced.176 Even more importantly, the Act would have produced 
inequitable results for early emissions reducers. It used the emissions 
intensity of the entire U.S. economy to set the emissions cap, and 
early reducers were not necessarily entitled to priority allocation of 
permits.177 This would have allowed less efficient members of the 
economy to obtain windfall credits. 
Obtaining early action credit under the Carper Clean Air 
Planning Act of 2006 also would have been difficult. It only allocated 
credit for emissions reductions that were achieved after the year 2000 
and that were registered under the 1605(b) Program or a state or 
regional registry.178 Even once credit was obtained, the Act restricted 
the amount of early emissions credits that could be used, and was 
unclear about the availability of credits after 2011.179 It did, however, 
feature a number of positive aspects. For one, early emissions 
reductions did not affect an entity’s baseline because that baseline 
 
 171. Id. § 203(a)(1)–(2). 
 172. See supra note 27 and accompanying text. 
 173. 151 CONG. REC. S7090–98, (daily ed. June 22, 2005) (proposing an amendment, the 
Climate and Economy Insurance Act of 2005, to H.R. 6, 109th Cong. (2005)) 
 174. Id. at S7093 (proposing § 1519(d)). 
 175. Id. at S7091 (proposing § 1514(c)). 
 176. See supra Part IV.B.2. 
 177. 151 CONG. REC. S7090 §1513(a). 
 178. See supra Part IV.B.3. 
 179. Clean Air Planning Act of 2006, S. 2724, 109th Cong. § 705(h)(3) (2006). 
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was based upon its proportionate share of the energy market, not on 
its historical emissions levels. In addition, it did not cap the use of 
credits from offsets projects. This would have encouraged 
investments in projects to reduce emissions of non-CO2 greenhouse 
gases. 
Finally, the Kerry-Snowe Global Warming Reduction Act of 
2006 delegated all the details of the cap-and-trade system to the 
EPA.180 Early emissions reducers would have had the opportunity to 
argue for credit during the EPA’s notice and comment proceedings. 
Compared to Congress, the EPA is much more familiar with the 
specifics of greenhouse gas emissions accounting and registration, 
and, due to its Climate Leaders program, is aware that substantial 
emissions reductions are already taking place. On the other hand, 
delegating so much of the program to the EPA would have likely 
produced significant delays in creating the cap-and-trade system. In 
the meantime, uncertainty would have inhibited some emitters from 
achieving emissions reductions. For this reason, legislation with well-
defined parameters is probably preferable. 
The proposed legislation considered in this Note demonstrates 
that a future federal program will most likely contain some form of 
credit for early action. Only the Climate Stewardship and Innovation 
Act, however, truly protected the interests of early emissions 
reducers. The other acts placed heavy restrictions on the recognition 
and use of early reduction credits to preserve a greater proportion of 
the cap for distribution among all covered entities. This approach is 
both inequitable and inefficient. It is inequitable because it transfers 
the benefit of the early emissions reductions to entities that proceed 
with business as usual, and it is inefficient because it forestalls 
investment into emissions reductions until the cap goes into effect. By 
allowing greater recognition and use of early emissions reductions, 
the Climate Stewardship and Innovation Act would have encouraged 
early investment into ordinary emissions reductions, sequestration, 
and other domestic projects. Future legislative proposals should build 
upon the model provided by the Climate Stewardship and Innovation 
Act. 
 
 180. Global Warming Reduction Act of 2006, S. 4039, 109th Cong. § 703(a) (2006). 
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CONCLUSION 
Greenhouse gas emitters in the United States have achieved 
substantial emissions reductions through voluntary programs and 
compliance with mandatory state regulations. There are several 
reasons why a federal greenhouse gas emissions program should 
provide credit for these early reduction efforts. First, reductions must 
take place soon if the world is to meet the goal of the UNFCCC and 
thereby avoid dangerous, human-induced changes in the earth’s 
climate without painful disruption to national economies. Second, it 
would be inequitable to allow emitters that proceed with business as 
usual to benefit from the costly reduction activities undertaken by 
early actors. Third, the registration guidelines promulgated by state 
and federal registries have become accurate enough to verify that 
emissions reductions are real, additional, and verifiable. Accordingly, 
given the growing expectation that federal climate change regulations 
will be promulgated by 2015, a method for crediting emissions 
reductions that are verified and reported should be developed. 
Early actors face several uncertainties with respect to a future 
federal cap-and-trade system for regulating greenhouse gas emissions. 
This Note identifies six elements of cap-and-trade systems that can 
affect early actors’ ability to claim emissions reduction credits: (1) 
what early reduction credits are available, (2) which baseline 
calculation method is employed, (3) how the overall emissions cap is 
allocated, (4) which greenhouse gases are regulated, (5) how offsets 
are treated, and (6) what types of entities are regulated. From the 
perspective of early emissions reducers, the ideal legislation should 
prospectively provide credit for present reductions in the event that a 
cap-and-trade program is enacted. Absent such legislation, a bill 
providing credit for past emissions reductions would ideally credit 
verifiable, registered reductions without limitations on the year in 
which they were achieved or the amount of credits that could be used 
to satisfy compliance obligations. An entity’s baseline should be 
adjusted for early emissions reductions, and the overall cap should be 
distributed in such a way that the benefits of early emissions 
reductions inure solely to early actors. The regulation should cover all 
major greenhouse gases and emitting industry segments and should 
allow covered entities to use offsets credits to meet their compliance 
obligations. If the enactment of such a regulation were foreseeable, 
greenhouse gas emitters would have strong incentives both to reduce 
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their own emissions and to invest in reduction, sequestration, and 
other projects by third parties. 
Until such regulation occurs, entities that reduce their emissions 
should ensure that they accurately account for and register their 
reductions in a voluntary registry. Reductions registered according to 
the 1605(b) Program’s revised guidelines stand the greatest chance of 
receiving federal credit due to the explicit crediting language included 
in the regulation and the more stringent standards it applies to 
“registered” reductions.181 Emitters should first target emissions of 
greenhouse gases with high global warming potentials. Emitters 
should also limit contracts for offsets reductions to domestic projects 
in areas with established accounting methods under a voluntary 
registry. Due to the potential for percentage limitations on use of 
offsets credits, such projects should be secondary to ordinary 
emissions reductions. Finally, early emissions reducers should be 
vigilant of a future cap-and-trade system’s methods for calculating 
baselines and allocating the emissions budget. Most legislation 
allocates considerable discretion to a federal agency to design these 
components of the system. Accordingly, early actors should rely upon 
the equitable and efficiency arguments provided in this Note to 
protect their interests throughout the agency’s rulemaking process. 
 
 181. See supra Part III. 
